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One of the salient difficulties Heidegger associates with the metaphysical 
tradition is a rigid dependency on the subject-object scheme of knowing. 
Philosophy, from Plato, envisions man as the knower over against the 
known and engages in “subjectivism” (Subjektitdt) and “representational 
thinking” (vorstellendes Denken), tendencies which Heidegger traces 
throughout the metaphysical tradition. This opposition to subjectivism—a 
collective and intensified “subjectivity” (Subjektivitat)—is a rejection of 
the idealist tradition, of the reduction of Being to a configuration of 
consciousness. In Descartes’ philosophy, for example, truth is grounded 
in a subject (in the human cogito) which functions autonomously. Even in 
Kant, despite an opposition to the acquisition of metaphysical knowledge, 
the dichotomy of the thinking subject over against the known is preserved.1 
Heidegger recognized this difficulty as early as Sein und Zeit, which is 
precisely the motive for his innovative notion, “Being-in-the-world” (In- 
der-Welt-sein). In contrast to Kant, who postulates the impossibility of 
knowing things-in-themselves, Heidegger insists that no subject-object 
demarcation exists between knower and known, that the knower is already 
“in” the world before reflective thinking takes place, and that the knower 
already has an awareness of the known. This knowing cannot be equated 
with conceptualization or with pre-conceptualization, however. The 
1 For Heidegger, Kant's thinking was necessarily enmeshed in the subject-object 
duality of the knower over against the known because his thinking initiated from the 
subject, from the a priori constructs of reflective thought, without investigating the 
ground of subjectivity which allows subjectivity (and reflective thought) to be possible, 
without investigating by way of a “preliminary ontological analytic*’ (vorgangigen 
ontologischen Analytik) the subject in its subjectivity.
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knowing which is characteristic of metaphysics (and which is basically 
reflective) presupposes a more fundamental knowing, a knowing which 
does not view the world merely as an object but as an integral relation to 
oneself.
Thought, for Heidegger, is not a matter of the correctness or incorrect­
ness of logical propositions—the kind of thinking in which metaphysics 
traditionally indulged—but a matter of what is prior to logical thinking. 
Reason is but a mode of thinking, not its essence—“reason and its concep­
tions are only one kind of thinking and are in no way determined by 
themselves”2 3and when reason “pushes everything into the presumable 
swamp of the irrational,”5 Heidegger claims that reason conceals the 
illumination on which its own illuminative mode is based. Correctness is 
insufficient for “original thinking” (urspriingliches Denken) and is possible 
only by virtue of original thinking. Metaphysics, accordingly, is sundered 
from the truth of Being and must deal in what Heidegger calls the “deriva­
tive form of the truth of knowledge” (abkiinftige Gestalt der Wahrheit 
der Erkenntnis) and the “truth of propositions” (Wahrheit der Aussage). 
Because metaphysics’ vision is necessarily confined to derivative forms of 
truth and to propositions of truth, it is incapable of penetrating truth in its 
primordiality and of investigating the illumination process which is “prior 
to all truth in the sense of veritas.”4 Although the subject-object split which 
characterizes the veritas of reflective thinking is displayed in the perceptions 
of metaphysics, Heidegger recognizes a more original truth prior to these 
reflective modes.
2 "Zur Seinsfrage” reprinted in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), 
p. 216.
3 Ibid.
4 Was ist Metaphysik ? (5th ed., containing “Einleitung” and "Nachwort”-, Frank­
furt: Klostermann, 1959), p. 10. This primordiality is evident even in his early discus­
sions of logos in Sein und Ze it, in which he argues that our understanding of “truth” 
depends on “our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the 
sense of ‘agreement’ [Ubereinstimmung]” (Sein und Zeil [Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1963;
10th ed.J, p. 33) and on our ability to discern “untruth” in terms of “hiddenness” 
( Verborgenheit).
Original thinking, however, is not thinking of Being in the sense that 
Being is a subject added to knowledge, as one of the possibilities of knowl­
edge, but is rather Being’s own manifestation: “Being is not a product of 
thinking. It is more the case that original thinking is an occurrence of 
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Being.”5 And just as metaphysics is dependent on Being, it is dependent 
on the “light” which allows its vision to be possible, a light which has 
ironically been concealed from it: “The light itself, which is to say, that 
which metaphysical thinking experiences as light, does not come within 
the range of metaphysical thinking.”6 In order to arrive at Being’s origin, 
prior to accumulated metaphysical conceptions, a light is imperative. 
Rather than being concerned with the “what” of human existence, 
Heidegger is concerned with the foundations—the illuminative founda­
tions—which permit knowledge of a “what” to be possible: the meta­
physical thinker must consider “from where he has taken the light to enable 
him to see more clearly.”7
5 JFas ist Metaphysik ?, p. 43.
6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 “Zwr Seinsfrage” reprinted in Wegmarkert, p. 244 (italics mine).
8 In Vom Wesen des Grundes Heidegger employs the term “ontological Difference” 
(ontologische Differenz) to illustrate the dilemma of metaphysics and to clarify his 
primordial enterprise. Since metaphysics has not treated the process which allows 
beings to be illuminated and which sanctions its own metaphysical insights, since it has 
not come to terms with Being-as-illumination, the distinctions it makes between beings 
and Being is not genuine. Metaphysics, moreover, is a ‘‘forgottenness” [ Vergessenheit} 
of the difference between Being and beings” (Holzwege [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1963; 4th ed.J, p. 336; my italics). This is a serious charge, one that underlies Heidegger's 
radicalization of thought.
Though it could be argued that Plato was also concerned with illumina­
tion, Heidegger’s thought is more primordial in that he is concerned with 
illumination as illumination, with the illumination process itself, with 
illumination prior to that which is illuminated. Though Plato’s Idea is the 
“source” (JJrsprung) of “visibility” (Sichtbarkeit), it is itself visible and per­
ceivable in the way that beings are perceivable. Plato’s truth, therefore, in 
its visibility and perceivability, has the quality of beings, and is oblivious of 
what Heidegger deems to be a more genuine “ontological difference.”8 
Although metaphysics has variously distinguished between beings and 
Being, the initial distinction arising with Plato’s equation of the Being of 
beings in terms of the absolute Idea, it has not treated the illuminative 
power (Being) which allows beings to be revealed as beings. Plato’s notion 
of truth as visibility is “representational” in that truth is re-presented 
(visualized) as an object over against a subject. And though metaphysics, 
from the time of Plato, envisions truth as something that can be seen, as 
something visible, it is precisely this sense of truth as visibly representa­
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tional, coupled with the dichotomy of knower and known, that Heidegger 
attempts to overcome.
Zen's Original Mind
Zen is also concerned with original thinking and with primordial illumina­
tion. Hui-hai, accordingly, speaks of an “original mind” which “shines 
forth brightly”9 and which “can be attained only through sudden Illumi­
nation.”10 Zen’s original thinking, which is likened to a “bright mirror,”11 
moreover, is akin to Heidegger’s primordial illumination which surpasses 
representational thought, which surpasses the Platonic and generally 
metaphysical tendency of equating truth with visibility, of identifying truth 
with that which can be seen and re-presented. “So long as the seeing is 
something to see,” Suzuki cautions, “it is not the real one.”12 It is because 
Zen Illumination cannot be equated with visibility as ordinarily under­
stood that Zen speaks of a “third eye”13—what Hui-hai appropriately 
terms “the Buddha-eye.”14 It must also be said that Zen would applaud 
Heidegger’s attempt to overcome subject-object duality, the duality of the 
knower over against the known. In his discussion of “original Mind,” 
Suzuki maintains that “there is no separation between knower and 
known” and adds that Zen is “the unfolding of a new world hitherto 
unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically-trained mind.”15 As Ha 
Tai Kim expresses it, Zen masters are concerned with “the attainment of 
a state in which all distinctions are superceded.”16 And finally, it must be 
said that Zen would embrace Heidegger’s overcoming of metaphysics’ 
exclusive concern with the intellect, the intellect which in fact sanctions 
subject-object duality. Suzuki defines satori, thus, as “an intuitive looking 
into the nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical or logical 
9 The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai (New York: 1972), p. 59.
10 Ibid., p. 43.
11 Ibid., p. 46.
12 The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind (London: 1949), p. 28.
13 Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series (London: 1927), p. 13.
14 The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai, p. 51.
13 Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, pp. 125, 230.




understanding of it,”17 and more sweepingly asserts that “the spirit of Zen 
abhors all forms of intellectualism.”18
17 Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, p. 230.
18 The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 14.
19 “The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism/* in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis 
(New York: 1960), p. 169.
20 Quoted in D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series (London: 1933), 
p. 100.
Despite these similarities, there are more fundamental dissimilarities 
that need to be elucidated. Although Heidegger indeed radicalizes reflective 
thought in his concern with a “primordial” or “original” (urspriingliche) 
thought, it is doubtful that he would be willing to embrace what Zen refers 
to as “no-thought” (wu-nien) or “no-mind” (wu-hsiri). One could argue, 
of course, that Heidegger doesn’t have to refer to his primordial endeavor 
as “no-mind,” that this dimension is already implicit in his radical dissocia­
tion with reflective thought. Still, what Zen means by no-mind is even more 
radical than Heidegger’s sense of original thought being primordial to 
reflective thought. Zen’s thinking is so original, so radically original, that 
it empties itself or un-thinks itself to the extent that it does not even have 
itself, does not even have itself as original thought, as original thought 
being opposed to any other kind of thought. Zen’s no-mind is so radically 
paradoxical that, despite what is preliminarily an effort to surpass ordinary 
dualistic thought, the ultimate realization is such that original thought 
does not exist in contradistinction to ordinary thought. By transcending 
the dualistic matrix of reflective thought, Zen does not deny that matrix 
but maintains that Mind is absolutely and paradoxically dualistic and 
non-dualistic at the same time. This is the thrust of Richard DeMartino’s 
term, “non-dualistic duality.”19 Any kind of discrimination is rejected in 
Zen. If one clings to dualism at the expense of non-dualism, one is “dual­
istically” entrapped; if one clings to non-dualism at the expense of dualism, 
one is dualistically entrapped. It is in this light that Tai-hai, a twelfth cen­
tury master, held a stick before an assembly of monks and gave them the 
following koan: “If you call this a stick, you affirm; if you call it not a 
stick, you negate. Beyond affirmation and negation what would you call 
it?”20 One could take Tai-hai’s question regarding a stick and apply it to 
Heidegger’s original thinking: beyond the affirmation or negation of 
ordinary thought itself, what would you call it?
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Heidegger’s concern with illumination is more akin to the teaching of 
Shen-hsiu, the famous Buddhist leader of the Northern School of China, 
who was the rival of Hui-neng of the Southern School. Shen-hsiu’s gatha, 
which he presented to the Fifth Patriarch of Zen, with the hope that this 
gatha would earn him the title of Sixth Patriarch, reads:
This body is the Bodhi-tree.
The Mind is like a mirror bright;
Take heed to keep it always clean
And let not dust collect upon it.21
21 Quoted in The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 17.
22 Ibid., p. 23.
23 Holzwege, p. 23.
24 Quoted in The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 22.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
Heidegger’s original thinking is similar to Shen-hsiu’s in that he seems to 
want to keep original thinking cleansed of the dust-like film of metaphysi­
cal thinking and reflective thinking generally. With reference to Shen-hsiu’s 
gatha, Suzuki notes that Shen-hsiu’s position does not adequately reflect 
the Zen position of original thinking not existing bifurcationally with ordi­
nary thinking, and queries, “Is not this dust-wiping, which is the same 
thing as ‘keeping one’s guard,’ an unwarranted process on the part of the 
Zen Yogin?”22 Heidegger, interestingly, especially in his later writings, 
maintains that one should keep a “guard” on Being, referring to man as 
the “guardian” (Wachterschaft) of the truth of Being, and very famously 
proclaiming man as the “shepherd of Being.”23
In contrast to Shen-hsiu’s gatha, Hui-neng’s gatha, which was accepted 
by the Fifth Patriarch and merited Hui-neng the distinction of Sixth 
Patriarch, reads:
There is no Bodhi-tree,
Nor stand of mirror bright.
Since all is void,
Where can the dust alight?24
Rephrasing the third line of this gatha—“from the first not a thing is”25— 
Suzuki recognizes it as “a bomb thrown into the camp of Shen-hsiu and 
his predecessors.”26 Despite Heidegger’s radicality with regard to tradi­
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tional metaphysics, this notion of Hui-neng’s would similarly have to be 
thought of as a bomb with regard to the entire Heideggerian enterprise. 
Heidegger, like Shen-hsiu, is concerned with dust-cleaning, not with no­
mind, not with mind so empty that dust-cleaning must be considered 
obsolete. In Zen, not only does the distinction between knower and known 
become obsolete, the distinction between the various kinds of knowing 
themselves (ordinary and original) must also be rendered obsolete.
Although Heidegger believes that thinking must undergo a radical 
unlearning, an upheavel of the inwrought ideas of “everydayness” 
(Alltaglichkeit)—“we can learn thinking only if we unlearn what has 
hitherto been the essence of thinking”27—Zen Mind is so paradoxically 
unlearned and so paradoxically empty that it does not even have itself, 
and just as it cannot be thought of in contradistinction to ordinary think­
ing, it cannot be thought of in contradistinction to everydayness. In order 
to fully appreciate this, one must understand that Zen’s transformation is 
threefold. The first phase is an ordinary mode of apprehending reality, a 
dualistic, representational perception comparable with Heidegger’s every­
dayness, an everydayness in which “mountains are mountains” and 
“waters are waters.”28 The second phase is a phase in which “mountains 
are no longer mountains, nor waters waters,”29 in which all forms (moun­
tains and waters) are emptied of their form-structure or radically de-form- 
alized. In the third phase, however, “mountains are again mountains, and 
waters waters.”30 In this final phase, in this Great Awakening, reality is 
no longer merely form (as in the first phase) nor formless (as in the second 
phase) but has been transformed into formless-form. In the Heart Sutra 
it is written: “Form (rupa) does not differ from the void, nor the void from 
form. Form is identical with void [and] void is identical with form.”31 
Because of this transformation of the Great Awakening, by virtue of its 
formlessness which is paradoxically all forms, Zen cannot be thought of 
as different from the everyday.
27 Was Heisst Denken ? (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1954), p. 5.
28 Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, p. 24.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Quoted in Charles Luk, Ch'an and Zen Teaching, First Series (Berkeley: 1970), 
p. 213.
From the Zen point of view, there is no ultimacy “apart” from the 
everyday, and to think that the essence of Zen is “contained” in such no­
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tions as Being and Nothingness is fallacious. In fact, if one pursues Zen 
strictly along the lines of abstractions such as Being or Nothingness at the 
expense of the everyday, one will surely miss Zen, for Zen is none other 
than everyday existence, none other than walking, chopping wood, cooking, 
or having a cup of tea. Zen must never be viewed as purely conceptual or 
contemplative in the sense of being deracinated from activity or life. On 
the contrary, Zen is most active and vital. Discussing Josetsu’s famous 
fifteenth century painting, Hydnen, in which a man is depicted attempting 
to catch a slippery fish with a gourd, Furuta Shokin reminds us of the 
necessary alertness and liveliness of the fisherman. There is no time for 
errors in judgement or for ponderous reflection. The fisherman must act 
suddenly, directly, without hesitation, with what Furuta calls “lively 
means.’*32 Nothing can be more “down to earth*’ or more concrete than 
this painting by Josetsu, for the very means of subsistence are at stake. 
Furuta explains, “One mistake and the path to understanding slips away 
like the catfish from the gourd.”33 That Zen is not abstract contemplative­
ness divorced from the concrete is most dramatically disclosed in the 
famous story about the Zen monk who, upon strolling across a bridge and 
upon being asked about the depths of the Zen river, seized one of the 
inquirers and would have hurled him into the river had not the inquirer’s 
friends interceded in his behalf.34 The only way to fathom the depths of 
the Zen river is not to hypothesize its depths but to actually plunge into 
its depths. The Zen monk, accordingly, would have cast the inquirer bodily 
into the river to illustrate this imperative, to convey that the river is not an 
abstract mental configuration but is none other than the actual river 
beneath them. Although the task of Zen is to realize the river with a differ­
ent mode of Being, to realize it as Formless Form which is ultimately no 
different than oneself, it must be said that the river as river is Zen, and to 
think that it points to something else, to an abstract configuration, is 
surely to miss the reality of the river and surely to miss the reality of Zen. 
Finally, that Zen is not a transcendentalism divorced from the concrete of 
everyday life is evident in the living conditions in a Zen monastery. Describ­
ing life in a Zen monastery, Suzuki notes that work is “considered a vital 
32 “Question and Answer in Zen,” trans, by N. A. Waddell in Philosophical Studies of 
Japan, x (1970), p. 115.
33 Ibid., 116.
34 Cf. D. T. Suzuki, Studies in Zen (London, New York: 1955), p. 56.
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element in the life of a monk. It is altogether a practical one, and chiefly 
consists in manual labour, such as sweeping, cleaning, cooking, fuel­
gathering, tilling the farm, or going about begging in the villages far and 
near.”35 This practical activity is more than the obvious necessity of main­
taining the monastery, it is a salient reminder to the inhabitants that their 
meditation is not directed at a reality divorced from their mundane 
concerns but has everything to do with such concerns. The master not 
only informs his students that having a cup of tea and just sweeping is Zen, 
he demands that they participate in having tea and sweeping in order to 
demonstrate that these activities are none other than Zen. In fact, it is 
precisely when a student believes that having tea and sweeping impede 
his Zen progress that the master may insist that he spend more time having 
tea and sweeping.
35 Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, p. 315.
36 Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 20.
In his Earth and Gods, Vincent Vycinas, reflecting on the integralness of 
earth and gods in Heidegger’s thought and arguing that Heidegger has not 
forsaken concrete reality in his ontological quest, contends that Heidegger 
“turns more radically to the things of everyday life with a highly respective 
attitude towards them and with a genuine and profound disclosure of 
their essences.”36 This radical turning, however, must be deemed less 
radical than Zen’s in that in Zen’s radicalization of the concrete, concrete 
reality is nothing “other” than original Mind. In Zen it is not even the 
case that one has to “turn” to concrete reality. From Zen’s most paradoxi­
cal standpoint one has never “left” the concrete. There can be nothing to 
turn to because ultimately there is nothing remote from original Mind 
toward which one can be said to turn. And the “highly respectful attitude 
towards” the things of everyday life that Vycinas sees in Heidegger’s 
thinking is also more fully radicalized in Zen because of Zen’s dissolution 
of this “towards.” In Zen one does not have a respectful attitude “towards” 
things. One is respectful in the sense that one’s respect is not “towards” 
anything but is the all-inclusive respectfulness of things themselves as they 
respect themselves, the all-inclusive respectfulness of one’s original Mind 
as it expresses itself as all things.
Continuing his discussion, Vycinas notes that “through the ontological 
symbol of the country road, Heidegger visualizes this belonging together 
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of Being and man.”37 Vycinas notes that Heidegger’s symbol of a way or 
road is not a public street road but a “country road or forest-trail,” ex­
plaining that “on a public highway Being can never be experienced” and 
that “the only place where Being is accessible are country roads or forest­
trails.”38 For Zen, however, ultimate realization cannot be confined to the 
country, cannot be confined anywhere. Zen, rather, as E. Ecker Steger 
puts it, “must be the pearl found in the market place.”39
37 Was Heisst Denken?, p. 164.
38 Earth and Gods, p. 20.
39 “The No-Philosophy of Zen,” The Personalist, lv (Summer 1974), 285.
40 “Uberwindung der Metaphysik,” Vortrage und Aufsdtze, 3 vols. (Pfullingen: 
Neske, 1961; 3rd ed.), I, 71.
41 Ibid., p. 64.
Heidegger's Uber windung der Metaphysik
Because metaphysics has restricted its horizon to conceptual formulations 
but has been oblivious of the illuminative process prior to these formula­
tions, Heidegger excludes metaphysics as an adequate means for his task. 
Heidegger, however, does not deem metaphysics as superfluous. On the 
contrary, he is cognizant of the significance of metaphysics but believes 
that, before an adequate metaphysics can be possible, the very illumination 
of which it partakes and on which it depends must be investigated, a condi­
tion valid not only for metaphysics but for all those disciplines which 
restrict their insights to metaphysical horizons—biology, psychology, 
philosophical anthropology, theology, logic, and onto-theo-logy in general. 
Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysical constructions is not an oblitera­
tion of metaphysics or a “denial” (Verleugnung) of metaphysics but a re­
thinking which may provide an adequate ground for metaphysics.
That the overcoming of metaphysics is not a metaphysical requiem, an 
utter renunciation of metaphysics, is evident in Heidegger’s contention 
that “overcoming is worthy of thought only to the extent that one thinks 
about incorporation [Verwindung],”40 which intimates not only the re­
establishment of a ground but the “delivering-over” (Uber-lieferung) to a 
ground on which metaphysics may rest. Incorporation is essential to 
Heidegger’s overcoming because he firmly believes that “metaphysics 
cannot be abolished like an opinion”;41 moreover, metaphysics’ abolish­
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ment is impossible because of its occurrence by virtue of the Being-process, 
its occurrence being a manifestation of the Being-process. Alluding 
to Descartes’ analogy of the philosophical tree, Heidegger contends 
that foundational thinking “does not tear up the root of philosophy. 
It tills the ground and plows the soil for this root.’’42 Heidegger is not 
promoting a dispensement of metaphysics, because it is and probably will 
always be the “root of philosophy” (Wurzel der Philosophic). Still, though 
the root of philosophy, metaphysics by no means is the root of thinking: 
“The basis of thinking,” he insists, “it does not reach.”43 Laying the 
foundation for metaphysics, therefore, is not arbitrary and certainly not an 
“empty systematic fabrication” (leeres Herstellen eines Systems). It is a 
process that is ever conscious of the intrinsic limits and possibilities of 
metaphysics, a process which is determinative of the very essence of 
metaphysics, a process which can be ascertained, in fact, only by means of 
a “laying bare” (Freilegung) of metaphysics’ “hidden ground” (yerborgener 
Grund).
42 Was ist Metaphysik?, p. 9.
43 Ibid.
44 “Zen and Some Comments on a Mondo," Philosophy East and West, xvn (Octo­
ber 1967), 91 (McCarthy italicizes “is”).
Zen's Dissolution of Metaphysics
The nature of Western metaphysics is such that it invariably attempts to 
prove something, to wrest some truth out of the universe, out of mind or 
out of Being, and to systematize it comprehensively. Despite his opposition 
to traditional metaphysics, despite his rejection of traditional notions of 
truth, Heidegger too has this speculative bent. Although Heidegger is not 
concerned with the traditional enigma of correctness and incorrectness, he 
is most speculative with regard to that which allows correctness and 
incorrectness to be possible—Being. Although this concern is undeniably 
a radicalization of metaphysics, from the Zen point of view this radical 
undertaking must itself be radicalized. According to Harold E. McCarthy, 
“Zen is the elimination of metaphysics in the sense that Zen is not meta­
physical at all.”44 Rather than solving metaphysical questions, Zen prefers 
to dissolve them. Although William Richardson aptly concludes that “the 
‘critical’ (erkenntnistheoretische) problem, so gravely posed by the Neo- 
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Kantians, dissolves,”43 it cannot be said that Heidegger’s Being, as a 
problem, dissolves. Although Heidegger surpasses the traditional problem 
of how the knower knows the known, he is nonetheless interested in illumi­
nation per se, and proceeds to delineate illumination ontologically in terms 
of Being’s revealment and concealment. Being as a theoretical problem is 
not dissolved in his thinking, it is generated and regenerated primordially, 
presumably by the Being-process itself.
45 Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1963), p. 102.
*6 Vortrage und Aufsatze, I, 44.
47 Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 291.
48 Ibid.
49 The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2 vols. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), i, 317.
Zen would respond to Heidegger’s Being-question by submitting that 
the question itself must be questioned—questioned to the point wherein 
questioning itself is dissolved. Questioning, for Heidegger, is the fertile 
ground of his thought, and questions are the seeds for thought. Without 
questions, thought would be impossible. Thought is only worthy of 
thought to the extent that it is “worthy of questioning,” a questioning 
which is “the fidelity [Frommigkeit] of thought.”45 6 As William Richardson 
explains, “The question of man, sc. about the process of There-being, in­
separable from the Being-question itself can never be answered. It is and 
remains essentially a question.”47 Richardson also notes that Heidegger’s 
Being-question is posed “indefatigably,” an indefatigability which he calls 
a “passion for knowing.”48 Pursuing Heidegger’s thought along this line, 
Herbert Spiegelberg surmises, “At times one might feel that he himself 
does not want an answer, but prefers to leave the question open with all 
its tantalizing mystery, and that a ‘genuine shipwreck’ (echtes Scheiterri) 
on the rocks of the question would satisfy him very well.”49 There is a 
difference, however, between leaving the question open, as Heidegger 
does, and this sense of shipwreck. Heidegger does not question to the 
point of shipwreck, to the point of the dissolution of questioning itself, 
and in this he differs fundamentally from Zen. Charles Fu clarifies this 
important distinction between Heidegger and Zen in his contention that 
“it never occurs (Es nie ereignet) to Heidegger that, in order to leave behind 
the question of Being transmetaphysically, he must make another—and 
final—radical attempt at transforming what he calls ‘thinking’ (Denkeri) 
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into what Zen Buddhists call ‘awakening’ (wu or satori), wherein lies man’s 
ultimate emancipation from all the onto-theo-logical fixations of language, 
thought, and reality.”50 Zen would be willing to embrace Heidegger’s 
remark that we have not learned how to question, but would radicalize 
this notion by submitting that one must question questioning itself—not 
to provide a philosophy or ontology of questioning, but to break through 
the metaphysics of questioning in such a way that questioning and the 
metaphysics of questioning are dissolved.
50 “Heidegger and Zen on Being and Nothingness: A Critical Essay in Trans­
metaphysical Dialectics'* (a paper presented in the Conference on “Being and Nothing­
ness in Chinese and Western Thought*’ at Fairfield University, May 30-June 4, 1978), 
p. 19.
51 An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 41. That
Oneness would be unacceptable to Zen is a salient point of Richard DeMartino’s. Zen 
cannot be thought of in the sense of “any alleged absolute monism,” he insists, in which
“one component is reduced to or absorbed by the other component” This is precisely
the thrust of his most paradoxical term, “nondualistic dualism” (“The Zen Under­
standing of Man,*’ unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Temple University, 1969, p. 121).
92 “The Human Situation in Zen Buddhism,** p. 164.
93 An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 108.
9< Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 15.
In response to the notion of oneness being a solution to the problem of 
duality, a Zen master asks, “After all things are reduced to oneness, where 
would that One be reduced?”51 One could substitute Heidegger’s Being in 
place of oneness in this context. Accordingly, in a dialogue with Heidegger, 
Zen would probably ask, now that you have reduced everything to this 
Being-question, where would this be reduced ? Heidegger, evidently, never 
pushed his questioning to the limit, to its own limit as questioning. He 
never arrived at what Zen calls the “great doubt,”52 a doubt in which all 
questions, answers, and thoughts are radically doubted, so radically 
doubted that they are emptied of themselves. It is precisely this sense of 
radical doubt that must accompany every koan. According to Suzuki, the 
koan is “neither a riddle nor a witty remark. It has a most definite objective, 
the arousing of doubt and pushing it to its furthest limits.”53 With regard 
to the last word that might be said about Being in Heidegger’s thought, 
William Richardson maintains that “it becomes increasingly clear that for 
him a last word probably cannot be said, insofar as the sense of Being lies 
in the fact that it is eminently questionable.”54 *Although Zen would not 
say that it has the last word—Zen is well aware of the endless creative 
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possibilities that can be engendered in speculative thinking—55 it reaches 
a point in its radical doubt wherein questioning becomes obsolete, wherein 
one’s questioning reaches “a limit of stability and the whole edifice” comes 
“tumbling to the ground.”56
35 As Hui-neng puts it, “he who understands the idea of no-thought-ness has a 
perfect thoroughfare in the world of multiplicities” (quoted in The Zen Doctrine of No- 
Mind, p. 126).
36 An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 95.
37 Was Heisst Denken?, p. 20.
38 Earth and Gods, p. 58.
59 The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 18.
60 The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai, p. 56.
According to Heidegger, every great thinker “thinks only one single 
thought,”57 a statement which is certainly indicative of his own thinking 
and which does seem to coincide with the orientations of great Western 
thinkers, despite their labyrinthine categories, whether it be Buber’s 
“interhuman,” Nietzsche’s “will to power,” Kierkegaard’s “individual,” 
or Freud’s “desire.” Indeed, “in spite of the great variety of Heidegger’s 
philosophical themes,” Vincent Vycinas appropriately notes that “he 
basically holds to one and the same thought, the thought of Being.”58 In 
contrast to Heidegger, however, Zen would say that its great thinkers have 
thought no-thought, that no-thought exists in contradistinction to other 
thoughts, and that by thinking no-thought one paradoxically thinks all 
thoughts. Interestingly, Suzuki claims that Shen-hsiu’s dust-wiping is a 
“means of concentration” which dwells “on one thought.”59 Again, 
Heidegger’s thinking is akin to Shen-hsiu’s, not Zen’s. Rather than 
Heidegger’s original mind which constantly dwells on the question of 
Being, Zen proposes a more radical mind, what Hui-hai refers to as a 
“non-dwelling mind.”60 And whereas Heidegger’s thinking may be re­
garded as a mode of concentration in the sense that it concentrates on one 
thought, Zen’s concentration, by virtue of its concern with no-thought, 
must be regarded as an un-concentration, for there is nothing which is 
con-centric to it. Moreover, the demands and stresses of ordinary concen­
tration are nullified. Zen’s concentrationless concentration is effortless. It 
is effortless because there is nothing to overcome (uberwinden), nothing any 
longer which needs to be broken through, no gaps or dichotomies, nothing 
apart from concentration unconcentrating transcentrically, nothing but 
transcentric concentration.
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